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Ro 
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks 
We The People’s Executive 
Perhaps to no one’s surprise, a recent survey found that most Americans 
know far more about television hits than they know about the United States 
Constitution. For instance, 52% of Americans surveyed could name at least two 
characters from The Simpsons, and 41% could name at least two judges from 
American Idol. Meanwhile, a mere 28% could identify more than one of the 
rights protected by the First Amendment.1 
Surveys such as this help clear up one of the apparent mysteries of the last 
five years: How did we change so quickly from a nation in which the rule of 
law seemed deeply entrenched to a nation that has seen an astonishingly 
successful executive power grab? 
The answer, I’m afraid, is that many Americans—including those who 
serve in Congress—neither know nor care very much about our constitutional 
system. Although the subject of constitutional checks and balances is a matter 
of endless interest to most of the people who populate America’s law schools, 
the rule of law and the protection of constitutional rights turn out to be matters 
of extreme indifference to quite a few of our fellow citizens. 
Over the past few years, President George W. Bush and his chief advisors 
have claimed a range of powers that would have turned Britain’s King George 
III green with envy. Among them: the power to alter permanently the 
constitutional balance of power and vitiate the Bill of Rights through a series of 
more or less ritual incantations about war; the power to detain and interrogate 
American citizens indefinitely, without charge or access to counsel; and, of 
course, the power to ignore any legislation deemed inconvenient, such as the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’s restrictions on warrantless domestic 
 
1.  Press Release, McCormick Tribune Freedom Museum, Characters from “The Simpsons” 
More Well Known to Americans than Their First Amendment Freedoms, Survey Finds 
(Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.freedommuseum.us/assets/pdf/e4/pressrelease/museum. 
survey_release.pdf. 
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spying or the McCain Amendment’s prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment. 
But the Bush Administration could not have made or sustained any of these 
claims without substantial help from outside the executive branch. The great 
post-9/11 executive power grab was enabled by a self-absorbed and somnolent 
populace and by a legislative branch that until recently seemed eager to cede 
power to the Bush Administration. From the hasty October 2001 Senate 
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act with only a single dissenting vote 
(Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold) to the similar non-debate and lopsided 
vote that preceded congressional authorization to use force in Iraq, Congress 
has acted more like a lap dog than a legislature. 
Like most other observers within the legal academy, I’m appalled by these 
developments. But they also underscore a point I have tried to make in my own 
scholarly writing: That though few of us lawyers care to admit it, the law on its 
own counts for practically nothing. Thus, the surprising thing is not that our 
constitutional system has been trampled on by the executive branch during the 
last five years, largely with popular and congressional acquiescence. The truly 
surprising thing is that our constitutional system lasted as long as it did, with 
the balance of powers envisioned by the Framers relatively intact. 
What I mean by this is that without a strong and widely shared public 
commitment to sustaining the rule of law, the Constitution itself is of little but 
historical interest. In and of itself, our Constitution has never meant much. Its 
meaning has always lain in its use. For much of American history, the 
Constitution has functioned as a symbol of our shared commitment to the rule 
of law (and principles of executive restraint), but the Constitution mattered 
only when we had, in the executive branch, citizens deeply committed to the 
principle of limited executive power constrained by law, and citizens in 
Congress, the judiciary, the press, and the public committed to the same. 
This should not surprise us. We have only to look at Iraq to see that no 
constitution can stave off political collapse in the face of centripetal societal 
forces, just as no constitution can keep a democracy from becoming a tyranny. 
This has always been true, everywhere. The various Soviet constitutions’ 
lengthy lists of individual rights kept no one from the Gulag, and the 
constitution of apartheid South Africa did not prevent institutionalized 
discrimination, torture, or extrajudicial killings. Here in America, our 
Constitution infamously failed to resolve disputes over slavery and federalism. 
When antebellum political consensus fractured, it took a civil war to 
(temporarily) answer the Constitution’s unanswered questions. 
Just as a checkbook can’t balance itself, our Constitutional system of checks 
and balances only works when most Americans share a disciplined and 
courageous commitment to making it work. And it’s this shared commitment 
to checks and balances that we seem to have somehow lost during these past 
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five years–or perhaps we lost it much earlier, and just did not notice until now. 
The Bush Administration itself clearly has zero commitment to the limits the 
Constitution places on executive power–but who can blame them trying to 
circumvent a system that is apparently cherished by neither Congress nor the 
public? 
As usual, the pragmatic and quotable Justice Jackson is apropos. In his 
famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the 1952 Steel 
Seizure Case, Jackson wrote:  
“I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in 
the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its 
problems . . . . If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim 
attributed to Napoleon that ‘The tools belong to the man who can use 
them.’ We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in 
the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from 
slipping through its fingers.”2  
In part, what I am saying is nothing new at all. It’s just another way of 
insisting that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, and so on. 
But I am also trying to say something more than this. One major moral of 
this particular story—the story of the Bush Administration’s successful power 
grab–is that law does not exist, and cannot be understood, within its own 
hermetically sealed universe. Law does nothing and means nothing outside of 
its cultural context. 
As a result, those of us unhappy with the way our constitutional system is 
working today will not be able to fix the problem through strictly legal 
means—we already have, on paper, a perfectly workable constitutional system. 
If we want to roll back unconstrained executive power, we need to look beyond 
the law to the broader political culture, and work on changing that. 
This has powerful implications for how law is studied, discussed, and 
taught within the legal academy. Legal scholarship has become increasingly 
technical, increasingly theoretical, and increasingly specialized. As Harvard 
Law Professor Bill Stuntz lamented recently in The New Republic, “Too many 
scholars write for an audience of dozens (if that—a good friend of mine says he 
writes for six people), and far too few write for thousands, fewer still for 
millions.”3 This, unfortunately, is as true of constitutional law scholarship as it 
is of legal scholarship more generally. 
 
2.  343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952). 
3.  William J. Stuntz, Summers and the Future of Higher Ed.: Future Shock, TNR ONLINE, Feb. 
27, 2006, http://www.tnr.com/user/nregi.mhtml?i=w060227&s=stuntz022706. 
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The result? When an issue comes along that arouses the deepest passions in 
those of us who study and write about the law, and we finally bestir ourselves 
to communicate some of our outrage to those outside the legal academy, we 
find, alas, that most of them aren’t listening to us at all, and fewer still are 
moved by our concerns. 
If the legal academy were to take seriously the notion that law is but a small 
part of culture writ large, we would do two things. First, we would alter our 
scholarly agendas and our curricula to reflect a commitment to studying law as 
a form of culture, striving not simply to develop neater and more original legal 
theories, but to understand the complex interrelationship between law and 
other political and social forces. And second, we would recall that in classical 
Greece and Rome, law was conceived as a close relation of rhetoric. Legal 
argument was seen not merely as a technical skill, but as a form of rhetorical 
art, one designed both to engage the mind and stir the passions and, ideally at 
least, to inspire civic virtue. 
In a world of academic specialization and turgid, jargon-laden law review 
prose, this may seem an odd way to think about law. But if we lawyers and 
legal scholars value the rule of law, we should strive to reclaim the ancient 
notion of legal argument as a public-regarding form of rhetoric. Because if we 
can’t convince our fellow citizens to know or care about our fragile 
constitutional system, which now lies in tatters, then little of what we do has 
any point at all. 
 
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of 
Virginia School of Law. She writes a weekly opinion column for The Los Angeles 
Times. 
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